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THE ALLOCATION OF COMPETENCES:
FOREIGN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Professor Dr. Torsten Stein*
I. PROVISIONS OF THE BASIC LAW RELATING
TO FOREIGN RELATIONS
A. THE LAW
ANY of the Basic Law provisions refer directly or indirectly to
foreign relations. Article 32, paragraph 1 provides that
"[r]elations with other States shall be conducted by the Federa-
tion."' Subsequent paragraphs deal with the Ldnder's portion of and par-
ticipation in foreign relations. I will come back to this in more detail
later.
Article 24 deals with the transfer of sovereign powers to international
organizations and the consent to have these powers limited for the bene-
fit of collective security systems, which was the basis of both Germany's
participation in the European integration until the Maastricht Treaty and
Germany's accession to NATO. For the European integration, Article 24
was replaced in December 1992 by the new Article 23, which apart from
being the result of a successful blackmail on the part of the Linder, com-
pletely lacks the sympathetic clarity of Article 24.2 In addition, Article 24
deals with agreements providing for obligatory international arbitration,
a provision which never materialized. 3 Since 1992, Article 24 deals with
new possibilities for foreign or at least transboundary activities of the
Linder, which will be discussed later.
Articles 45 and 45(a), which foresee a Committee on European Union
and a Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Federal Diet, only indirectly
relate to foreign relations. The provision, under which the Committee on
European Union could exercise the Federal Diet's rights in relation to the
Federal Government in accordance with Article 23, gave rise to some
* Europe-Institute, University of Saarland, Saarbrucken, Germany.
1. Grundgesetz [Constitution] [GG] art. 32, para. 1 (F.R.G.).
2. See generally BRUN-OTro BRYDE ET AL., GRUNDGESETZ-KOMMENTAR (3d ed.
1995) [hereinafter Commentary on the Basic Law].
3. See H. MOSLER ET AL., HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS DER BUNDEGREPUBLIK
DEUTSCHLAND VII, § 179 (2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter MANUAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW].
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constitutional debate.4
Under Article 59 paragraph 1, the Federal President represents the
Federation in its international relations, concludes treaties with other
States on its behalf, and both accredits and receives envoys. 5 Of horizon-
tal importance on the constitutional level are Article 59, paragraph 2 and
Article 73, No. 1. The former provides for participation of the legislative
bodies in the treaty-making process, and the latter vests the Federation
with exclusive legislative power in foreign affairs.
If the President of the European Parliament, Jos6 Maria Gil-Robles,
was correct in recently saying that "a true foreign policy needs an army,"
then Article 87(a) of the Basic Law, dealing with the establishment and
employment of Armed Forces, also has indirect links to foreign relations.
The President of the European Parliament, deploring that the European
foreign policy is limping behind United States ("U.S.") foreign policy,
said: "You only have a foreign policy if you have an army that makes
itself respected. Otherwise foreign policy is not credible." Americans
may agree with that statement more than Germans, but no matter
whether this statement is true or not, I mention Article 87(a) of the Basic
Law for another reason. Since the Amsterdam Treaty introduced the so-
called "Petersberg Tasks" into the Treaty of the European Union (the
"EC Treaty") as part of the common security or common defense policy, 6
the decision whether to deploy German armed forces, as a reserved na-
tional domain, may be decided, at least in part, by the European Union.7
The articles previously mentioned are the law on the books. The reality
is, at all times, a little different.
B. THE REALITY
In terms of sovereignty, the core provision of the Basic Law on foreign
relations is certainly a provision that has never been amended since the
adoption of the Basic Law.8 But it never told the plain truth. When Arti-
cle 32 paragraph 1 came into force on May 23, 1949, the Federal Republic
of Germany was all but sovereign.
When Germany was occupied, the occupying powers conducted or
gave consent for Germany's foreign relations, if there was any. Some of
4. See Commentary on the Basic Law, supra note 2, at art. 45, marg. no. 2.
5. Until the day when a President of the United States or Europe will receive foreign
ambassadors in Brussels, this article of the Basic Law will neither be changed in its wording
nor in its meaning.
6. See generally TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992,
O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992) 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC TREATY].
7. The so-called "Petersberg Tasks," which are humanitarian, rescue tasks,
peacekeeping, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management (including peacemaking
forces), were first adopted by the Council of Ministers of the West European Union
("WEU") in their "Petersberg-Declaration" of June 19, 1992. Recent plans foresee a
merger of the European Union ("EU") and the WEU. See Recommendation 642 on WEU
and European defence: beyond Amsterdam, Assembly of WEU, Proceedings, 45th Sess., at
17 (June 1999).
8. See GG art. 32, para. 1 ("Relations with foreign States shall be conducted by the
Federation").
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this remained even after the treaties of 1954, although the Convention on
Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many stated in Article 1 paragraph 2 that "[t]he Federal Republic shall
have accordingly [after the termination of the Occupation regime] the full
authority of a sovereign State over its internal and external affairs."9 But
Article 2 of that Convention already provided that "in view of the inter-
national situation ... the Three Powers retain the rights and the responsi-
bilities, heretofore exercised or held by them, relating to Berlin and
Germany as a whole, including the reunification of Germany and a peace
settlement." 10 These rights included, for example, a residual, non-deriva-
tive right to station armed forces in Germany. The German government
was reminded of that right in 1966 when France unilaterally withdrew
from NATO's military integration. In response, the German government
declared France's right to station armed forces in Germany under the
1954 Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces unexercisable, and it
offered a new agreement that France bluntly refused by reference to its
retained rights.'1
The incompleteness of Germany's external sovereignty became appar-
ent with respect to any treaty with its neighbors that contained provisions
concerning Germany's borders. Not only the famous "Ostvertr~ige"' 12
with neighbors in the east, but also small and rather technical rearrange-
ments of the borders to the West required a Three Powers consent and
were deemed to apply only provisionally.
The residual powers of the Allies were not overly important in every-
day life, but the united Germany achieved full sovereignty over its inter-
nal and external affairs only by the Treaty on the Final Settlement with
respect to Germany of September 12, 1990 (the "2+4" Treaty).13 Article 7
paragraph 2 of that treaty repeats what had already been provided in the
Relations Convention of 1954, but this time it meant what it said.14 Presi-
dent Bush stated that this Treaty "creates the basis for the emergence of a
... sovereign Federal Republic of Germany, capable and ready to assume
a full and active partnership in the North Atlantic Alliance [and] the Eu-
ropean Community. ... "115 Relations with foreign States were no longer
9. BGBI. II S.305.
10. Id. at art. 2.
11. See BULLETIN DES PRESSE-UND INFORMATIONSAMTES DER BUNDESREGIERUNG
No. 60 at 469, No. 161 at 1304.
12. See Agreement Between the Polish People's Republic and the Federal Republic of
Germany Concerning the Basis for Normalization of Their Mutual Relations, Dec. 7, 1970,
830 U.N.T.S. 327, Czechoslovakia, Dec. 11, 1973, U.N.T.S. Reg. No. 13589, the Soviet
Union, Aug. 12, 1970, BGBI. II, S. 353, and the former GDR, June 6, 1973, BGBI. II, S.
421.
13. BGBI. II, S. 1317. See also Torsten Stein, External Security and Military Aspects of
German Unification, 51 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHEs RECHT UND
VOLKERRECHT 451 (1991).
14. The European Community had already put out its feelers quite far towards the
foreign relations of its Member States.
15. See Message to the Senate Transmitting the Treaty on the Reunification of Germany,
39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1443 (Oct. 1, 1990).
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exclusively conducted by the Federation, at least if one understands for-
eign policy as not being limited to its strictly political, security, or general
aspects, but including foreign trade relations, which have always been a
foreign policy instrument.
II. FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Since the Maastricht Treaty, the difference between the external rela-
tions of the European Community ("EC") and the foreign policy of the
European Union ("EU") need discussing.
A. EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
The EC Treaty confers only a few express external relations powers,
which are mostly treaty-making powers, to the Community. The former
Article 111, which provided for the negotiations of tariff agreements with
non-EC States, was abolished by the Maastricht Treaty. Currently, Arti-
cle 133 allows for the negotiation of treaties relating to the common com-
mercial policy of the Community, and Article 310 allows for the
conclusion of association agreements with non-EC States or international
organizations with the aim of establishing reciprocal rights and obliga-
tions, in addition to common action and special procedures. Finally, Arti-
cle 301 allows for an action by the EC to interrupt or reduce, in part or
completely, economic relations with one or more third-party countries for
reasons of common foreign and security policy. Until the introduction of
the then Article 228(a) into the EC Treaty in Maastricht, the EC and its
Member States debated whether such economic sanctions, which were
not motivated by economic, but by foreign policy considerations, fell
under the jurisdiction of the EC or remained within the powers of the
Member States. Article 228(a), which is currently Article 301, ended that
debate and formally enacted the two-step procedure previously applied.
Member States make the political decision to apply sanctions, while the
necessary legal measures to implement the decision are taken by the EC,
mostly in the form of regulations. There remain, nevertheless, some
problems which will be discussed later.16
Of greater importance than the powers expressly attributed in the
Treaty are the implied powers developed by the European Court of Jus-
tice (the "Court"). A strict interpretation of the few provisions on exter-
nal relations might have led to the conclusion that the Treaty was
intended to be exhaustive on the EC's international role, but the Court
developed the doctrine of parallelism where the EC's external relations
powers are co-exsitent with its internal legislative powers. 17 This doctrine
was developed in the European Road Transport Agreement (ERTA)1 8
16. See Torsten Stein, Aufienpolitisch motivierte (Wirtschafts-) Sanktionen der
Europaischen Union - nach wie vor eine rechtliche Grauzone?, in RECHT ZWISCHEN UM-
BRUCH UNi) BEWAHRUNG 1129 (Ulrich Beyerlin et al. eds., 1995).
17. See CHARLESWORTH & CULLEN, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 63 (1994).
18. See Case 22/70, Commission v. Council, 17 E.C.R. 263 (1971).
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case, where the Council and the Commission disagreed on who was com-
petent for negotiating and concluding the agreement, the EC or the
Member States, represented by the President of the Council. The Court
said that in the absence of a specific attribution of external relations com-
petence in this area, the general system of external relations in the Treaty
should be examined. From this, the Court concluded that "in external
relations, the Community enjoys the capacity to establish contractual
links with third countries over the whole field of objectives defined in the
Treaty," so that a treaty-making power may also flow "from other provi-
sions of the Treaty and from measures adopted within the framework of
those provisions, by the Community institutions." 19 Since the Court re-
ferred to both the Treaty and acts of institutions, the question remained
whether implied external relations powers require at least some more ex-
plicit internal legislation. The answer was first given by the Court in the
Kramer case20 (conservation of marine resources) and later in the Inland
Waterway Vessels Opinion,21 where the Court stated that external rela-
tions powers of the EC arise "by implication from the provisions of the
Treaty creating the internal power and in so far as the participation of the
Community in the international agreement is necessary for the attainment
of one of the objectives of the Community. ' 22 Thus, the existence of EC
legislation on any given policy area is not a prerequisite for the external
relations power to exist. This necessity alone preempts Member States'
jurisdiction, even if the EC has not yet exercised its competence inter-
nally. At best, Member States could act in these fields on the interna-
tional level as "trustees" of the EC and in close coordination with the
latter.
Under the Court's case law, there is not much foreign relations power
for Member States in constantly extended areas where the EC Treaty
provides for an EC Policy. Thus, necessity of future EC action is re-
quired. Where competence is shared between the EC and the Member
States, the international agreements entered in these fields are known as
"mixed agreements," and both the EC and the Member States may be
parties.23
B. COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY OF THE EU
In contrast, the general foreign policy, unrelated to trade, remained
"domaine rgserv6" of the Member States for many years. During irregu-
lar and informal meetings, heads of state or government tried to coordi-
nate their foreign policies in areas of assumed common interest, but they
19. Id. (emphasis added).
20. Joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76, Kramer, 1976 E.C.R. 1279.
21. Opinion 1/76, Inland Waterways Vessels, 1977 E.C.R. 741.
22. Id. (emphasis added).
23. See Craig de Btirca, EU LAW 117 (2d ed. 1998); Allan Rosas, Mixed Union - Mixed




did not commit themselves to execute what they had agreed upon in
theory.
The Single European Act of 1987 first tried to establish a European
cooperation, not integration, in the sphere of foreign policy. The obliga-
tions flowing therefrom, if any, were obligations under public interna-
tional law, not obligations under EC law. Furthermore, the obligations
were sufficiently vague. For example, the High Contracting Parties
should "endeavour" jointly to formulate and implement a European for-
eign policy. They undertook "to inform and consult each other" before
deciding "on their final position." Common positions were not more than
"a point of reference" for national policies.2 4 Even though heads of state
and foreign ministers were to meet regularly, they could still go home
afterward and execute a contrary position to what they seemingly had
agreed upon before.
Title V of the Treaty on European Union (the "second pillar") intro-
duced the "Common Foreign and Security Policy"2 5 ("CFSP") which was
apparently closely connected to Germany's reunification, even though
Germany wanted to demonstrate that it remained a reliable ally and a
dedicated partner in european integration. Title V slightly tightened the
rules applicable to foreign policy but did not introduce many changes, as
compared to the previous European Political Cooperation. Foreign pol-
icy remained on the lower level of intergovernmental cooperation, al-
though closer links were established to the "integration pillar" through
institutional identity, a single institutional framework (the Council of the
EC Treaty also became the Council for the CFSP), and through treaty
provisions on consistency between the different pillars.
Member States from that point on had to actively and unreservedly
support the EU's external policy and refrain from any action contrary to
the interests of the EU or that impaired its effectiveness. Member States
had to inform and consult one another on foreign and security matters of
general interest, and ensure that their national policies conformed to
eventual common positions adopted by the Council. Furthermore, joint
actions adopted in the Council committed the Member States in the posi-
tions they adopted and in the conduct of their activity. But these obliga-
tions were still under international, not EC law, and decisions in the
Council on common positions and joint actions were to be taken by una-
nimity. Any abstention prevented the decision from being taken.
The balance of the CFSP in the five-and-a-half years' reign of the
Maastricht Treaty is not overly impressive. Joint actions primarily related
to such exciting topics as monitoring elections in far-away countries, and
common positions in many cases simply duplicated binding resolutions of
the United Nations ("UN") Security Council in the context of the conflict
24. See Single European Act, Feb. 28,1986, Eur. Union, Title 11I, art. 30, 1987 O.J. (L
169) (emphasis added).
25. See Rosas, supra note 23, at 3-85.
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in former Yugoslavia.26 Neither the EU, nor the Western European
Union ("WEU"), its new "integral part" for decisions and actions having
defense implications, brought peace or a cease-fire to Bosnia. It was the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") that did so, and NATO
still and primarily means the United States.
The Treaty of Amsterdam tried to improve Title V 27 by introducing a
presumably more effective decision-making procedure. Unanimity re-
mains a precondition, but abstentions no longer prevent the adoption of
decisions. Member States, which qualify their abstention by making a
formal declaration, shall not be obliged to apply the decision but shall
accept that the decision commits the EU. They shall refrain from any
action likely to conflict with or impede EU action based on that decision.
Later, I will discuss the difficulties which may be related to this new deci-
sion making procedure.
If Member States with more than one-third of the weighted votes in the
Council qualify their abstention, the decision shall not be adopted. The
Council may even act by qualified majority when taking a decision on the
basis of a so-called "common strategy" decided by the European Council
(heads of state or government and President of the Commission). In that
case, however, a Member State may oppose the adoption of a majority
decision on grounds of important reason of national policy. This is the
first time that the notorious "Luxembourg Compromise" of the mid-six-
ties was expressly mentioned in the Treaties. A qualified majority in the
Council may then refer the matter to the European Council for decision
by unanimity, but this probably means referring it "at calendas graecas."
Be this as it may, the question at the end of this brief survey of EC and
EU competences in the field of foreign relations is whether there is a
conduct of relations with foreign States for Germany under Article 32
paragraph 1 of the Basic Law, apart from accrediting and receiving
envoys.
III. WHAT IS LEFT FOR NATIONAL FOREIGN POLICY?
At first glance, the EU occupies most of what counts in foreign rela-
tions, not in the sense that Europe alone decides, but in the sense that
Member States cannot do many solo runs. Whenever the EC is vested
with treaty-based or implied external relations power, the Council, with
few exceptions, acts by a qualified majority so that foreign relation inter-
ests of some Member States are outvoted. Whenever matters of foreign
and security policy are deemed to be of general interest, Member States
have to inform and consult the others. They simply cannot go forward
alone. They would have to veto any intended Council decision on a com-
mon position or joint action to regain their freedom of national foreign
26. See LARS MONCH, DIE GEMEINSAME AKTION ALS MITIFEL DER GEMEINSAMEN
AUPEN- UND SICHERHEITSPOLITIK (Duncker & Humboldt 1997).
27. See Jaap de Zwaan, Community Dimensions of the Second Pillar, in THE EURO-
PEAN UNION AFTER AMSTERDAM 179 (Ton Heukels et al. eds., 1998).
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policy. Whether a mere qualified abstention could produce the same re-
sult is doubtful.
Member States may still play a role in foreign relations, even in areas
otherwise falling under EC jurisdiction. Article 20 of the EC Treaty deals
with diplomatic or consular protection of citizens of the EU in the terri-
tory of a third country by the authorities of any Member State of the EU
if their home State is not represented there.28 The required negotiations
to secure acceptance of that kind of protection by third States are for the
Member States, not for the EC. There remains the escape clause in Arti-
cle 297, not granting, but presupposing, Member States' right to take uni-
lateral action in the field of international relations in internal or external
emergency situations or to carry out obligations under international law.
Unfortunately, one may say, the Court of Justice took the Macedonia
Case (Commission v. Greece)29 off its list. This was the first case that
could have brought some clarity to the amount of discretion Member
States enjoy under Article 297.
Member States retain the freedom to decide whether they want to en-
gage their armed forces in an operation led by Europe. As previously
mentioned, the CFSP includes the so-called "Petersberg-Tasks," which
are humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping, and tasks of combat forces in
crisis management (including peacemaking forces). For the elaboration
and implementation of these tasks, the EU "will avail itself of the West-
ern European Union. '30 In the Petersberg Declaration of June 19, 1992,
WEU Member States confirmed their readiness to make military units
available from the entire spectrum of their conventional forces for WEU-
led operations. Only two years later, the Federal Constitutional Court
cleared the way for Germany's participation in such operations and en-
ded the controversial debate on whether the Basic Law allowed the en-
gagement of the armed forces for other tasks other than the defense of
the country or of the alliance.31 In its July 12, 1994 decision,32 the Court
left unanswered the question of whether Germany alone, or together with
one or more other States, could engage its armed forces in any military
operation that would be legal under international law. But the Court
stated that such an engagement would be compatible with the Basic Law
in all cases where it would take place under the authority of a "system of
28. See Torsten Stein, Die Regelung des diplomatischen Schutzes im Vertrag iber die
Europaische Union, in DER I)IPLOMATISCHE SCHUTZ IM VOLKER-UND EUROPARECHT 97
(Georg Ress et al. eds., 1996).
29. See the application for interim measures in Case 120/94, Commission v. Greece,
1994 E.C.R. 3077. The Commission withdrew its case before the Court's ruling and after a
political solution had been obtained. The order of the Court's President and the opinion of
the Advocate General can be found in Case 120/94, Commission v. Greece, 1996 E.C.R.
1513.
30. EC Treaty, supra note 6, art. 17, para. 7.
31. See generally RECHTLICHE ASPEKTE EINER BETEILIGUNG DER BUNDESREPUBLIK
DEUTSCHLAND AN FRIEDENSTRUPPEN DER VEREINTEN NATIONEN (Jochen Frowein &
Torsten Stein eds., 1990).
32. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfGE] 90, 286 (F.R.G.) [hereinafter Federal
Constitutional Court].
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collective security." In no uncertain terms, the Court described the UN
and NATO as being such systems. The decision is not equally clear with
respect to the WEU, which is also mentioned. Thus, one can conclude
that Germany's participation in WEU operations would be possible
under the constitution.
This does not, however, mean that there is also an obligation to partici-
pate. The Petersberg Declaration states that "[m]ember States will de-
cide whether to participate in specific operations as sovereign States,
according to their respective constitution." In Germany, according to the
1994 Constitutional Court decision, which amended rather than simply
interpreted the Basic Law, prior approval by the Federal Diet is required.
The EC Treaty brings no change in this respect. All decisions in the EU
Council having military or defense implications have to be taken by una-
nimity.33 The same is true for the WEU Council. Even if the new deci-
sion-making process, with respect to the CFSP and the principle of
"consistency," gives rise to some ambiguities, it could not overrule the
previously quoted provision in the Petersberg Declaration.
Apart from this, all other highly political topics seem to be taken away
from purely national foreign relations and have to at least be discussed,
and preferably coordinated, in the EU's council. Investment protection
agreements, cultural relations, and the promotion of small and medium
size enterprises remain with foreign affairs.
IV. PROBLEM AREAS
The allocation of foreign policy competences between the EU and its
Member States, as previously described, does not solve all possible con-
flicts. Let me just name economic sanctions as an example. Since the
Maastricht Treaty came into force, economic sanctions as a foreign policy,
and not a purely economic measure, require a unanimous decision (com-
mon position) in the Council acting under Title V of the CFSP. Next, a
proposal from the Commission and a subsequent decision with the quali-
fied majority of the Council acting under Article 301 of the EC Treaty is
required. All Members of the Council that vote for the common position
have, according to the principle of "consistency," to vote in favor of the
regulation designed to implement the common position. If a qualified
majority of Member States do not vote in favor of the regulation, then
the regulation cannot be adopted.34 There is no way to oblige Member
States to vote in favor of the second step. Neither Title V, the CFSP, nor
Article 3 paragraph 2 of the EC Treaty ("consistency") fall under the ju-
risdiction of the Court of Justice. 35
33. See EC TREATY, supra note 6, art. 23, para. 2.
34. See Torsten Stein, Das Zusammenspiel von Mitgliedstaaten, Rat und Kommission
bei der Gemeinsamen Au3en- und Sicherheitspolitik der Europdischen Union, in 2
EUROPARECHT 69 (1995).
35. See EC TREATY, supra note 6, art. 46. See generally IRIS CANOR, THE LIMITS OF




If the Security Council of the U.N. imposes economic sanctions, and
Member States fail to achieve the required majorities for the common
position or the implementing regulation, the burden of implementing the
Security Council decision returns to the Member States because they are
responsible for carrying out the decision of the Security Council.
The situation may become even more complicated under the new deci-
sion-making procedure introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty. If one or
more Member States, in a vote for a common position on certain sanc-
tions, abstain and qualify their abstention by way of a formal declaration,
they are not obliged to apply the decision, but they are obliged not to
impede it. If, for example, the sanction is directed against a foreign state
airline for no overfly or landing, can those who abstained continue to
grant landing rights? Or could this amount to impeding the action of the
EU, with the consequence that those who abstained have to go along? If
so, what good is the abstention? The EU faced that situation in 1998 with
respect to sanctions against the Jugoslav Airline, JAT.
Take the case where the common position or joint action concerns a
decision having military or defense implications, a decision that has to
implemented by the WEU. Does a Member State of the EU, which ab-
stained in the qualified manner in the EU Council and who is a member
of the WEU and NATO, have to vote in favor of all decisions in WEU
and NATO that require unanimity in order not to impede or act contrary
to the decision adopted in the EU? Could that State even have to engage
its own military assets if they were vital for the success of the action of the
EU or WEU? What is the effect of a qualified abstention? I could go on
inventing scenarios which would make it quite clear that the whole sys-
tem of distributing foreign relation powers between Europe and its Mem-
ber States will only work if the Member States profoundly agree on the
objecting and the means required. Two aspects remain, the federal aspect
and the judicial control over the foreign relations power shared between
the EU and its Member States.
V. THE FEDERAL ASPECT
The component states of the Federal Republic of Germany, the
Linder, constantly complain that their powers are increasingly usurped
by the EU. This may be true for other areas, but not for foreign relations.
Under Article 32 of the Basic Law, the Linder, insofar as they have
power to legislate internally, may conclude treaties with other States with
the consent of the Federal Government. A collection of those treaties
published in 199436 demonstrates that in a number of cases, the Federal
Government has not refused to give that consent. The European integra-
tion has not changed that picture. On the contrary, the Lander seems to
36. See generally ULRICH BEYERLIN ET AL., SAMMLUNG DER INTERNATIONALEN VER-
EIN13ARUNGEN DER LANDER DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND (1994).
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have gained additional foreign relation competence in the course of Eu-
ropean integration.
They have achieved considerable influence on the integration policy of
the Federation under the new Article 23 of the Basic Law. Article 23,
paragraph 6, in particular, as well as the respective laws providing the
details, establish that the exercise of the rights of the Federal Republic of
Germany as a Member State of the EU shall be transferred by the Feder-
ation to a representative of the Linder, whenever an intended EC mea-
sure essentially affects the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the Linder.
The Linder, under Article 24, paragraph 1(a), which was introduced into
the Basic Law during the process of ratification of the Maastricht Treaty,
have also obtained the right to transfer their sovereign powers to trans-
frontier institutions, as far as they have the right to exercise state powers
and to discharge state functions. The Linder does, however, need the
consent of the Federal Government for that transfer. An example of the
implementation of Article 24, paragraph 1(a) is the so-called "Karlsruhe
Agreement" of 1996 among the Federal Republic of Germany, France,
Luxembourg, and Switzerland on transboundary cooperation between
territorial communities and local authorities. Additionally, the Linder
established representatives in Brussels who behave like embassies, so that
it seems fair to conclude that the role of the Linder in the field of foreign
relations has not been weakened by the European integration but, on the
contrary, has been strengthened.
VI. JUDICIAL CONTROL
The last question is who is to exercise judicial control over the foreign
relations power shared between the EU and its Member States. I will not
deal with judicial control over the compatibility of the EC Treaty and an
agreement which the EC intends to conclude with a third-party State or
organization. This could be done under Article 300, paragraph 6 of the
EC Treaty, through a binding opinion of the Luxembourg Court. The
national Constitutional Court may be called upon to decide whether a
matter falls within the limited competence of the Lander and not in that
of the federation.
The question I will deal with is whether the partition of foreign rela-
tions powers between the EU and its Member States creates lacuna with
regard to the judicial protection of individuals whose rights may be in-
fringed by foreign relations measures. In principle, measures of a State
which fall under its foreign relations power are not exempt from judicial
control,37 even though a constitutional court's standard of scrutiny de-
pends on the nature of the challenged act. The closer to the core area of
the foreign relations power, the less it involves direct encroachment on an
individual's fundamental rights, and the more a constitutional court could
37. See HANS-JOACHIM CREMER, DER SCHUTZ VOR DEN AUSLANDSFOLGEN
AUFENTHALTSBEENDENDER MABNAHMEN 223 (1994).
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limit itself to a mere rationality standard. The more, however, direct and
serious encroachment on the fundamental rights of an individual are at
stake, the stricter the scrutiny by the constitutional court must be. Serious
infringements on importers' or exporters' rights may be at stake with re-
gard to embargos decided upon by the EU's Council, first as a common
position within the framework of the CFSP, and then later under Article
301 of the EC Treaty, when a regulation is adopted which bans all imports
from and exports to a given country.
In such a situation, the European Court of Justice would be competent
to judicially control the second step, the regulation. But the Court is not
competent, according to Article 46 of the EC Treaty, to decide whether
the first step was legal under international law. If an importer or ex-
porter claims that the embargo decision in the CFSP council was illegal
under international law because it constitutes a disproportionate reprisal,
or because the EU had no right to interfere at all under international law,
which court will hear that argument? The European Court could deal
with that problem incidentally, deciding that the law whose observance it
has to ensure in the interpretation and application of the Treaty when
dealing with the subsequent regulation, including public international
law. It is, however, doubtful whether the European Court is prepared to
do this based on present case law.
Another possibility would be to challenge the embargo before a do-
mestic court, and ultimately before the Constitutional Court. Even if one
accepts the second step, that the regulation falls within the exclusive com-
petence of the European Court, the first step (common position) remains
intergovernmental cooperation, which is not subject to the jurisdiction of
the European Court. It would, however, not be easy to draw clear dis-
tinction between those two steps. Then, the national Constitutional
Court would be seen as exercising judicial control over the regulation.
The remedy may come from a different institution, the European Court
of Human Rights. Until recently, the supervisory bodies of the European
Convention on Human Rights refused to control acts of Member States
taken within the european integration, saying that such acts could not be
challenged because the EC is not a Contracting Party. This result was
unambiguous in the French Trade Union case.38 Later, in the Melchers
case, 39 the Commission stated that judicial control over acts of Member
States within the framework of the European Communities were not per
se excluded, but that the European Court in Luxembourg enjoyed
priority.
The new and single permanent European Court of Human Rights re-
cently decided in the Matthews case 40 that the European Convention on
38. Conf~dration Francaise D6mocratique du Travail v. European Communities,
App. No. 8030/77, 13 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 231, 239-40 (1978).
39. App. No. 13258/87, 64 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 128 (1988).
40. Matthews v. United Kingdom, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 361 (1999). The judg-
ment is published in its most important parts in EUROPAISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRT-
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Human Rights does not exclude the transfer of jurisdiction to interna-
tional organizations, provided that the convention rights continue to be
secured, and that Member States' responsibility continues even after such
transfer. That court, consequently, held the United Kingdom responsible
for securing the voting rights guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol 1 in
Gibraltar, regardless of whether the elections were purely domestic or
european.
This decision might indicate that, in view of the "shared sovereignty" in
Europe between Member States and the EU, and with regard to several
"partial european constitutions," including those of the Member States,
the EC Treaty and the European Convention on Human Rights form a
"Constitution of Europe." The European Court of Human Rights could,
in the future, fill those gaps in judicial protection which might, inter alia,
arise out of the allocation of foreign relations powers between the EU
and its Member States.
SCHAFTSRECHT 308 (1999), with an annotation by the former Advocate General of the
European Court of Justice, Lenz.
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